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                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                                            
 
                           N0. 01-1299 
                                            
 
                          PAMELA DINNER, 
 
                                        Appellant 
 
                                v. 
 
              UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION 
                    CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 
                                            
 
         On Appeal From The United States District Court 
             For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
                   (D.C. Civil No. 99-cv-04603) 
            District Judge:  Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
                                            
 
         Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                         January 24, 2002 
 
    BEFORE:  BEFORE:  NYGAARD, and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges, 
                    and SLEET, District Judge* 
 
                (Opinion filed: February 27, 2002) 





*  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet, United States District Judge for the 
District of Delaware,   
    sitting by designation.
                                            
 
                 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                                            
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
     This is an appeal from a jury verdict finding in part that the United 
Service 
Automobile Association Casualty Insurance Company ("USAA") did not act in 
bad faith 
in handling plaintiff Pamela Dinner's ("Dinner") claim for underinsured 
motorist benefits 
("UIM").  Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the district court erred 
in precluding her 
expert witness from testifying about the applicability of the Unfair 
Insurance Practice Act 
("UIPA"), 40 Pa. Cons. Stat.  1117.1, et seq., or the regulations 
promulgated thereunder, 
the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices regulations ("UCSP"), 31 Pa. Code  
146.1, et 
seq.  Plaintiff further claims that the District Court erred by rejecting 
her proposed jury 
instructions which referenced those provisions. 
               Factual and Procedural Background 
     On May 16, 1994, Dinner was involved in an automobile accident in 
Sedona, 
Arizona.  As a result of the accident, Dinner sustained a broken right 
wrist, a dislocated 
right elbow and an orbital hematoma of her right eye.  At the time of the 
accident, Dinner 
had an auto insurance policy with USAA, which included underinsured 
motorist benefits.  
Dinner promptly notified USAA of her condition.   
     Two layers of insurance existed in front of USAA, the tortfeasor's 
and the UIM 
coverage of the rental vehicle in which the Dinners were riding at the 
time of the 
accident.  These two layers were paid by September 28, 1995.  USAA paid 
Dinner on 
September 10, 1997, over three years after Dinner first notified USAA of 
her claim. 
     Nearly two years after receiving her settlement check, Dinner filed a 
claim in 
federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction and alleging that USAA 
acted in bad faith 
within the meaning of 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.  8371.  In support of this 
claim, Dinner offered 
the expert testimony of Barbara Sciotti.  Sciotti intended to testify that 
Pennsylvania had 
adopted a statute, the UIPA, and regulations, the UCSP, that lay out the 
obligations of 
an insurance company in handling claims.  Further, Sciotti intended to 
testify that 
USAA's handling of Dinner's claim violated a number of provisions of the 
statute and 
regulations.  Prior to trial, USSA moved in limine to exclude all of the 
testimony of 
Sciotti under Rule 702 and that portion of her testimony that stated that 
USAA's conduct 
violated the UIPA and the UCSP regulations under Rule 403.   
     The District Court denied the Rule 702 motion in limine.  The Court 
warned, 
however, that Sciotti's ability to answer fully, would "depend upon [the] 
. . . questions" 
that plaintiff's counsel asked.  Appendix at 328. 
     With respect to the second part of the motion in limine, Dinner 
argued that 
Sciotti's testimony was relevant because it would inform the jury that 
insurance 
companies have rules that govern "the day-to-day work" and that "carefully 
prescribe 
what they are supposed to do."  Appendix at 324.  In response, USAA argued 
that the 
statute does not give rise to an "independent cause of action," Appendix 
at 325, and that 
the statute states explicitly, that "any of the following acts, if 
committed or performed 
with such frequency as to indicate a business practice, shall constitute 
unfair claim 
settlement or compromise practice."  Appendix at 326 (quoting 31 Pa. Code 
 146.1) 
(emphasis added).  Further, USAA argued that given the standard for bad 
faith in 
Pennsylvania, "some technical violations under the UIPA . . . shouldn't 
serve as a basis 
for bad faith."  Id.  The District Court agreed with USSA and held,  
                    the Uniform Insurance Practices Act's requirements are 
not 
          admissible to establish a standard or basis in this case.  I 
feel 
          that no matter what I would say to the jury . . . to limit the 
          applicability of those standards, . . . admitting them would far 
          outweigh the   or would be far outweighed by the prejudice 
          that would accompany them.  
  
Appendix at 327. 
     During trial, Dinner again raised the question of whether or not her 
expert could 
use the UIPA and UCSP as underpinnings for Sciotti's testimony about 
USAA's handling 
of the claim.  Specifically, Dinner claimed that Sciotti would testify 
that USAA did not 
complete its investigation of the claim within 30 days and did not keep 
the claimant 
advised in writing why they had not done so as required by the statute.  
After considering 
the arguments of the parties, the Court held: 
                         In looking at this, in order to prove the case, 
basically, 
          plaintiff must show that the insurer had no reasonable basis 
          for its decision, and that the insurer knew or recklessly 
          disregarded the absence of a reasonable basis for its decision. 
 
                         And in doing that, the plaintiff, I assume will 
rely on 
          various circumstantial evidence to prove what was in the 
          insurer's mind at the time these decisions were being made.  
          And plaintiff would like to rely on these statutory or   or the 
          regulations that have certain standards placed on insurance 
          companies and on the insurance industry in general. 
 
                         And it is my feeling that   as it was before  
that 
          pointing to certain arbitrary deadlines, under the 
          circumstances, would give the appearance, in the minds of the 
          jury, far more weight than probative value. And I don't think 
          that an instruction could cure that.  So I'm not going to 
          change my original decision. 
 
Appendix at 400-01.  However, the Court allowed Sciotti to testify as an 
expert because, 
as it explained later, "she's probably got a working lifetime experience 
in what the 
industry expects as far as processing a claim.  And I think she can 
probably give her 
testimony without relying on [the UIPA or UCSP]."  Appendix at 416. 
     On appeal, Dinner challenges this ruling and the concomitant decision 
of the 
District Court to exclude her proposed jury instruction which included 
language from the 
UIPA and the UCSP regulations. 
                       Standard of Review 
     In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert 
testimony, we apply 
the abuse of discretion standard.  See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 
U.S. 136, 142-43 
(1997).  Under that standard we will not reverse such a ruling under Rule 
403 "unless it is 
arbitrary and irrational."  Robert S. v. Stetson School, Inc., 256 F.3d 
159, 169 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citations omitted).  "[A] trial court is in a far better position 
than an appellate court 
to strike the sensitive balance dictated by Rule 403.  When a trial court 
engages in such a 
balancing process and articulates on the record the rationale for its 
conclusion, its 
conclusions should rarely be disturbed."  Government of the Virgin Islands 
v. Pinney, 967 
F.2d 912, 917-18 (3d Cir. 1992).  
     When reviewing a jury charge "where the objection is properly 
preserved, our 
inquiry is whether the charge, 'taken as a whole, properly apprises the 
jury of the issues 
and the applicable law."  Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 
74 (3d Cir. 
1998).  "It is the inescapable duty of the trial judge to instruct the 
jurors, fully and 
correctly, on the applicable law of the case, and to guide, direct, and 
assist them toward 
an intelligent understanding of the legal and factual issues involved in 
their search for 
truth."  9A Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure 
 2556 at 438 (2d ed. 1995). 
                           Discussion 
     In 1981, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to create a common 
law cause 
of action for plaintiffs alleging that their insurance company refused to 
pay a claim in 
"bad faith."  D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 431 
A.2d 966 (1981); 
Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 524, 529 (3d Cir. 
1997) (describing 
history).  In 1990, "[i]n what some call a delayed response to D'Ambrosio, 
the 
Pennsylvania legislature enacted 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.  8371 entitled 
'Actions on Insurance 
Policies,'" which creates a private right of action for "bad faith" 
claims.  Polselli, 126 
F.3d at 529.   
     In 1994, the Pennsylvania Superior Court defined bad faith and set 
the standard for 
determining whether an insurance company acted in bad faith.  See 
Terletsky v. 
Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 680, 688 (Pa. Super. 1994).  
The court noted 
first that the term "bad faith" had acquired particular meaning in the 
insurance context: 
                    "Bad faith" on part of insurer is any frivolous or 
unfounded 
          refusal to pay proceeds of a policy; it is not necessary that 
          such refusal be fraudulent.  For purposes of an action against 
          an insurer for failure to pay a claim such conduct imports a 
          dishonest purpose and means a breach of a known duty (i.e., 
          good faith and fair dealing), through some motive of self- 
          interest or ill will; mere negligence or bad judgment is not bad 
          faith. 
 
Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 139 (6th ed. 1990)).  The court then 
went on to 
create a two-part standard for evaluating "bad faith" claims: "to recover 
under a claim of 
bad faith, the plaintiff must show [1] that the defendant did not have a 
reasonable basis 
for denying benefits under the policy and [2] that defendant knew or 
recklessly 
disregarded its lack of reasonable basis in denying the claim."  Id.; see 
also Klinger v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing the two 
part standard in Terletsky). 
     Prior to Terletsky, the Pennsylvania Superior Court had looked to the 
UIPA and 
the UCSP to give content to the concept of bad faith as used in 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat.  8371.  
See, e.g., Romano v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 646 A.2d 
1228 (Pa. 
Super. 1994).  Terletsky did not, however, and it is apparent from a 
comparison of the bad 
faith standard it adopted with the provisions of the UIPA and the UCSP 
that much of the 
conduct proscribed by the latter is wholly irrelevant to whether an 
insurer lacks a 
reasonable basis for denying benefits and, if so, whether it knew or 
recklessly disregarded 
that fact.  
     It necessarily follows that a violation of the UIPA or the UCSP is 
not a per se 
violation of the bad faith standard and that it is only the Terletsky 
standard itself that 
allows one to determine whether a violation of the former is of any 
relevance in a case 
like the one before us.  It is also apparent that reference to the fact 
that the defendant's 
conduct violated the UIPA or the UCSP holds the potential for the jury's 
verdict being 
influenced by irrelevant matter.  In these circumstances, it is not 
surprising to find no 
Pennsylvania cases holding that reference to the UIPA or the UCSP in 
addition to the 
Terletsky standard is mandatory.  In the particular circumstances of this 
case, it was well 
within the discretion of the District Court to find that reference to 
these statutes was 
unnecessary and potentially prejudicial and thus to rely solely on the 
Terletsky standard. 
     The UIPA prohibits engaging in "unfair methods of competition" or 
"deceptive 
acts or practices" in the business of insurance.  See 40 Pa. Cons. Stat.  
1171.4.  The 
statute defines "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices" 
to include numerous forms of conduct.  See id. at  1171.5.  Sciotti 
intended to testify that 
USAA violated five statutory provisions.  Most of the acts defined as 
"unfair methods of 
competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" do not have 
relevance to the 
question of whether or the insurer had a reasonable basis for denying 
benefits under the 
policy and knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis in 
denying the 
claim.  See Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 688.  Rather, the majority of the 
provisions go toward 
establishing the timing of investigations and payment of claims.  The 
remaining 
provisions simply require normal good business practices.  Moreover, to 
constitute 
"unfair claim settlement or compromise practices," an insurer has to 
commit or perform 
the acts "with such frequency as to indicate a business practice."  Id. at 
 1171.5(10). 
     Likewise, the three provisions of the UCSP that Dinner claims USAA 
violated are 
not relevant to resolving a dispute of "bad faith" under the Terletsky 
standard.  Like the 
statute, these regulations limit the scope of potential violations by 
requiring that the 
standards be "violated with a frequency that indicates a general business 
practice, . . . to 
constitute unfair claims settlement practices."  31 Pa. Code  146.1 
(emphasis added). 
     Here the trial court allowed Sciotti to testify, as an expert, about 
the substance of 
those actions of USAA which she believed were committed in "bad faith."   
Sciotti was 
allowed to testify about a number of instances of perceived misconduct 
based on her 
knowledge of the case and the insurance industry.  While she was not 
allowed to use the 
UIPA or UCSP as underpinnings for her findings, references to them were 
not necessary 
to allow the jury to understand and apply the Terletsky standard and, as 
the District Court 
found, would hold a potential for substantial, unfair prejudice to USAA.  
The District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that any relevance of 
Sciotti's testimony was 
outweighed by the potential for prejudice to USAA. 
     For substantially the same reasons, the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion 
by refusing to instruct the jury with respect to the provisions of the 
UIPA and the UCSP. 
     The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
                                                
 
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 
 
     Please file the foregoing Memorandum Opinion. 
 
 
                               /s/ Walter K. Stapleton  
                                                   Circuit Judge
 
